Is there a role for language policy in immigration policy? This article examines recent attempts to legislate language in light of historical and contemporary debates about immigration and immigrant assimilation. It chronicles U.S. language politics and policy, and then appraises national language and o‰cial English bills recently introduced in Congress in view of data on language usage and preferences, suggesting ways that the current resurgence of a national debate about language could and should impact the larger debate about immigration.
Introduction
Language policies -established via legislation, court decisions, executive action, or other means -may 1) determine how languages are used in public, 2) abet the cultivation of language skills needed to meet national priorities, or 3) a‰rm and protect the rights of individuals or groups to learn, use, and maintain languages. They may also deal with a government's own language use, e.g., by facilitating clear communication, guaranteeing due process, fostering political participation, and/or providing access to public services. The United States has never had an o‰cial language policy. There is no federal agency charged with coordinating decisions about language use or resources. Yet it is impossible for the U.S. or any government to be neutral towards language because governments necessarily make choices about which language or languages to communicate in. These choices influence the value of the linguistic expertise of various groups in the population, especially immigrants whose native language is not a primary language of the host country. The same is true in the institutional contexts of work and school. In the U.S., the dominance of English in government, industry, education, and popular culture has made it the most important element in the construction of national identity, both as a communicative instrument shared by members of the nation and as a boundary marker a‰rming their distinction from others (Zolberg and Long 1999) . This paper examines recent attempts to legislate language in light of historical and contemporary, theoretical and political, debates about language, immigration, and immigrant incorporation. It chronicles U.S. language politics at the state and national levels, including school policies. Finally, it o¤ers an appraisal of national language and o‰cial English bills introduced in Congress as part of immigration reform, suggesting ways that the resurgence of a national debate about language could impact the larger debate about immigration.
A history of language politics and policies in the United States Documented concerns about linguistic unity in the U.S. date back to Benjamin Franklin's opposition to the use of German -at one time the native language of about a third of the residents of Pennsylvania. Bilingualism was very common in the eighteenth century and still relatively common in the nineteenth, when a belief that ''American English both reflected and constituted the democratic and rational nature of the country'' emerged (Portes and Schau¿er 1996: 10) . For some influential thinkers, this meant far more than establishing a common language for practical reasons. English came to be seen as a crucial unifying elementuniquely suited to define the nation and its citizens (Fishman 1966) .
It is not exceptionally American to regard language as a ''pillar of groupness'' (Edwards 1994: 129) . Anthony Smith (1971) traces the origins of linguistic nationalism to late eighteenth century German romanticism, particularly to the influence of Johann Herder. Though he was known to enjoy other languages and cultures, Herder's writings position nonGermans as out-groups. His follower Johann Fichte was more acerbic. Fichte's famous Addresses to the German Nation (1968 [1807] : 58-59), delivered under French occupation of Prussia, deprecated others' languages just as it emphasized the importance of his own. He claimed ''the German speaks a language which has been alive ever since it first issued from the force of nature, whereas the other Teutonic races speak a language which has movement on the surface only but is dead at the root.'' 2 While ridiculous from a linguistic standpoint, this statement draws attention to the enormous power of language, to unite and to exclude. Though defenders and promoters of English in the U.S. have not gone so far as to claim that other languages were ''dead at the root,'' linguistic nationalism is perhaps most interesting when expressed within a nation of immigrants. Table 1 describes the four great waves of immigration to the United States. Table 2 summarizes the data that are shown graphically in Figure  1 : the level of federal-and state-level language legislation in each period, the percentage of policies enacted at the federal level, and the percentage of policies that support multilingualism. (The appendix lists each policy.)
The most striking feature of Figure 1 is the steady decline in the percentage of language policies that protect or promote non-English languages. Despite increasing acceptance of multiculturalism, the legislative trend has been to protect English rather than to encourage Americans to learn or maintain other languages alongside English.
1.1. Early Settlement through the second wave of immigration (1600-1870s)
From the founding of the United States, policymakers pursued two linguistic goals: maintaining non-English languages and helping those who did not speak English to learn it. The founding fathers (even Franklin) were not convinced that language should or could be made o‰cial. Having an o‰cial language might have symbolic implications, but the very nature of language defied ''fixing'' it (Marshall 1986: 71) . Statesman and jurist John Marshall argued that Americans' geographic and social mobility would create ''an identity made through individual choice, not one mandated by public laws' ' (cited in Heath 1977: 273) . To the extent that state and federal language policies 3 existed in the formative U.S., they overwhelmingly supported non-English speakers' language rights -often by requiring that government documents to be printed in other languages as well as English. 4 In Pennsylvania, the state legislature authorized the University of Pennsylvania to teach a full range of subjects in German, and allowed for state support of private German schools. Reflective of the fact that Germans were the largest non-Englishspeaking immigrant population during most of the 1800s; thirty-three of the fifty-eight language policies adopted before 1880 specifically mention the German language (see Appendix).
The legal status of French in the Louisiana Territory, and later in states it encompassed (particularly Louisiana), was more contested. In 1804 Congress granted rights to a bilingual government and bilingual schools in the French-Speaking Orleans Territory. But in 1811 Louisiana had to pass an O‰cial English law in order to gain statehood. Nevertheless, most county-level business was conducted in French. In 1845 the State Legislature declared French to be its o‰cial language, despite the 1811 law.
In 1848 the U.S. annexed a substantial portion of Mexico. Mexicanheritage people (indigenous groups and Spanish-heritage mestizos), could rightly say, ''I didn't cross the border, the border crossed me.'' But the mestizos immediately became, at least in o‰cial terms, ''Americans'' whereas indigenous people in the annexed areas did not gain citizenship rights until 1924. New Mexico's statehood (first attempted in 1850 and granted in 1912) was delayed until, in the words of one prominent politician, ''the migration of English-speaking people who have been citizens of other States does its modifying work with the Mexican element'' (Baron 1990: 8; Simmons 1993) .
Large numbers of Germans continued to come to the U.S., and in some urban areas anti-foreign political groups began to emerge. These evolved into the nativist Know-Nothing movement of the 1850s, the ''American Party.'' In part, the American Party was reacting to the latest wave of German immigration, the ''48-ers,'' who were more educated than earlier migrants and brought ''radical'' ideas with them. The American Party was strongest in 1855, seating six governors on a platform that called for developing ''a sentiment of profoundly intense American feeling'' (Higham 1966 (Higham [1955 : 7). But soon thereafter, the North-South divide submerged nativism. The Civil War ended the American Party because it united xenophobes and immigrants on both sides. Notably, in 1861 the Texas legislature decided to print the Confederate Constitution in English, Spanish, and German.
After the Civil War, at least twenty-one of the thirty-eight states took o‰cial action to promote immigration (Higham 1966 (Higham [1955 : 18). For example, in an attempt to steer Mennonite immigrants toward their states, Ohio, Indiana, and Kansas guaranteed that they would be exempted from military service. But immigration was not on the national political agenda; it was left to the states. By and large, state language policies in this period favored multilingual instruction and language rights for nonEnglish speakers. In California, where in the 1860s about 30 percent of the State's population was foreign-born (not counting people of Mexican descent), public ''cosmopolitan schools'' emerged (first in San Francisco). These schools promoted fluency and literacy in French and German as well as English.
While early pro-German laws were mostly pragmatic, 5 post-Civil War education policies trended toward active support for bilingualism. Iowa, Kansas, and Nebraska all passed laws stating that schools must teach German (as well as English) when parents wanted them to (Kloss 1940: 616) . Wisconsin did not require the teaching of any non-English language but school boards were free to establish non-English programs as they saw fit. In Illinois, and 1869 law established that ''modern'' languages (German, French) could be the primary means of communication in schools (Kloss 1940: 620) .
The German American Teachers' Union, founded in 1870, saw the introduction of German-English public schools as a way to influence the whole American education system. (Previously, most German schools were private.) The shift from ''special schools'' for German-heritage children to German -taught to Anglo children too -in public schools was a way to counter the Anglo status quo. The e¤ort was abetted by Catholic Anglos, who felt more in common with German Catholics that with Protestant Anglos. Another reason that Catholic and Protestant Anglos accepted German in the schools was that they were suspicious of the private German schools, believing that these schools hindered assimilation. From the Protestant viewpoint, encouraging German in the public schools meant that German-heritage children could get an Anglo-American education in the German language (Kloss 1940: 669) .
The third wave of immigration
The 1880s saw the highest level of immigration yet. By 1890, 14.7 percent of the U.S. population was foreign born. The 1900 Census shows a slight drop, to 13.6 percent, and by 1910 the figure was again 14.7 percent. 6 The new immigrants were predominantly from Southern and Eastern Europe. They were Catholic, Greek Orthodox, or Jewish and tended to settle in urban rather than rural areas. The influx of immigrants corresponded to the shift from a predominately agriculture-based economy to a predominantly industrial one in which the labor market was more susceptible to economic cycles. In 1888 the American Economics Association o¤ered a prize of $150 for the best essay on ''The Evil E¤ects of Unrestricted Immigration'' (Higham 1966 (Higham [1955 : 41). At the same time, temperance crusaders and women's rights supporters feared European attitudes on these issues. Nativism expressed as nationalism ran high during the depression of 1893-1897, even though it was the non-acculturated (e.g., non-English speakers) who were hit first by the hard times (Higham 1966 (Higham [1955 ; Marshall 1986 ).
Rather suddenly, Germans were no longer the largest and most politically influential group of bilinguals in the U.S. Many states and territorial governments passed laws against public and private German-language schools. O‰cial support for Spanish in New Mexico was growing. An 1889 law required Spanish-English bilingualism for lower-level government jobs, and a 1891 law established that public schools could provide instruction in English only or in Spanish and English. Reflecting the new immigrants' origins, in 1894 Ohio passed a law requiring Czech and Polish newspapers to print all o‰cial announcements.
Meanwhile, the settlement movement, ''originally a means of enhancing the foreigners' self-respect, the doctrine of 'immigrant gifts,' '' launched an active defense of the foreign-born against nativism and a justification for reform e¤orts in their behalf (Higham 1966 (Higham [1955 : 121). The movement provided services to immigrants while showing appreciation for their culture based on the belief that that mingling old and new would produce a more cosmopolitan society. Settlement movement supporters disseminated this doctrine widely after 1900 and allied reform elements, including social-gospel Protestants, espoused it. Business interests also began to turn pro-immigrant.
In 1906 Congress passed a law that standardized the naturalization process (preventing political bosses from ''naturalizing'' immigrants on the eve of an election in order to buy their votes). As a compromise to the nativist, the law also required spoken English for naturalization. The following year, Congress appointed a joint committee, headed by Senator William P. Dillingham of Vermont, to study immigration's impact on the country. Their reports are lengthy and quite nuanced, but the committee, guided by the theories of influential nativist scholars, concluded in 1911 that new immigration consisted mostly of ''inferior peoples'' who were physically, mentally, and linguistically di¤erent and would thus not easily adopt ''fundamental American ideals'' (King 2000: 64, italics added) . 7 Meanwhile, the United States Immigration Commission (1907) (1908) (1909) (1910) posed the following argument in favor of a literacy requirement for immigration:
The illiteracy test will a¤ect almost entirely those races whose immigration to the United States has begun within recent times and which are most alien in language and origin to the people who founded the 13 colonies and have built up the United States; that it would tell most heavily against those classes of immigrants which now furnish paupers, diseased and criminal, excluded by existing law, and is therefore a continuance of the present policy of the United States which has met with general acceptance; that .the immigrants who would be excluded by the illiteracy test do not go out into the Western and Southern States, where immigration is needed, and become an agricultural population, but remain almost entirely in the Atlantic States and in the great centers of population, where the labor market is already overcrowded; that the illiterate immigrants who would be excluded by the bill proposed by the committee are largely congested in great cities and furnish a large proportion of the slum population; that the illiteracy test would shut out those classes of immigrants which statistics show contribute most heavily to pauperism and crime and juvenile delinquents. . . . In one word, it may be said that this measure will exclude a larger number of undesirable immigrants, so far as statistics can be relied upon, than any restriction which could be devised. (King 2000: 47) They urged Congress to impose many restrictions on new immigration, two of which eventually became law: literacy (in any language) for all immigrants aged sixteen or older in 1917 8 and an annual immigration quota of 350,000 in 1921.
World War I heightened anxieties about national loyalty and immigrant assimilation. The Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917 required publishers of foreign-language news to provide English translations. During and following the war, a patchwork of state and local language laws emerged. Many states prohibited the teaching of German in the primary grades. The governors of Iowa and South Dakota issued decrees prohibiting the use of any language other than English in public places or over the telephone (Piatt 1990) . Schools required children to take language loyalty oaths. A 1919 Nebraska statute banned teaching any language other than English before the ninth grade (Dillard 1985; Marckwardt 1980) . In 1923, an Illinois law even targeted speakers of British English, declaring ''American'' to be the state's o‰cial tongue (Tatalovich 1995: 63-69) . 9 The intensity of the drive to force linguistic (and other forms of ) assimilation on early-twentieth-century immigrants sometimes took forms that today read like satire. For example, in his classic analysis of American nativism, historian John Higham (1966 Higham ( [1955 ) uses the Ford Motor Company's compulsory English school, in which the first thing students learned to say was ''I am a good American,'' to illustrate the idea of a melting pot that churned out streams of like-minded, Englishspeaking Americans. Only slightly more colorfully than Higham, novelist Je¤rey Eugenides portrays the Ford English School in his Pulitzer-Prizewinning novel Middlesex. In this passage, ''Lefty'' is a Greek immigrant on the verge of graduation.
The curtain parts to gasps and scattered applause. A pained flat shows a steamship, two huge smokestacks, and a swath of deck and railing. A gangway extends into the stage's other focal point: a giant gray cauldron emblazoned with the words FORD ENGLISH SCHOOL MELTING POT. A European folk melody begins to play. Suddenly a lone figure appears on the gangway. Dressed in a Balkan costume of vest, ballooning trousers, and high leather boots, the immigrant carries his possessions bundled on a stick. He looks around with apprehension and then descends into the melting pot . . . Now SYRIA descends into the pot. Then ITALY. POLAND. NORWAY. PALESTINE. And finally: GREECE. ''Look, it's Lefty!'' . . . GERMANY taps him on the back. ''Macht schnell. Excuse me, Go faster. '' In the front row, Henry Ford nods with approval, enjoying the show . . . His blue seagull's eyes dart from face to face as the English instructors appear onstage next. They carry long spoons, which they insert into the pot. The lights turn red and flicker as the instructors stir. . . . and the melting pot boils over. Red lights brighten. The orchestra launches into ''Yankee Doodle.'' One by one, the Ford English School graduates rise from the cauldron. Dressed in blue and gray suits, they climb out, waving American flags, to thunderous applause. (Eugenides 2002: 104-105) In retrospect, such vigorous e¤orts to promote immigrants' quick transition to English were unnecessary. Immigration slowed to a snail's pace during the 1930s, due first to restrictive legislation finalized in 1924 10 and then the Great Depression. The halt in new immigration sped linguistic assimilation among those who were already in the U.S., overwhelmingly leading to English monolingualism by the third generation. The notion that this pattern is one that immigrants should follow became powerfully entrenched, and is present even today. Some immigrant parents still encourage their children to speak only English, fearing that bilingualism will invite discrimination (Fishman 1966 ).
The fourth wave
In the 1960s, immigration reform, the Civil Rights Act and the Voting Rights Act provided -collectively -a new basis for minority groups to politically and culturally articulate their ethnic identities. The basis for immigration reform was the Hart-Celler Act of 1965, a by-product of the civil rights revolution. The measure was not intended to stimulate immigration from Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and elsewhere in the developing world. Rather, by doing away with the racially based quota system, its authors expected that immigrants would come from what were by then viewed as ''traditional'' sending societies, e.g., Italy, Greece, and Poland, that received very small quotas under the 1921 (1924) law. The new law replaced the old quotas with preference categories based on family relationships and job skills. It allowed for, annually, 170,000 from the Eastern Hemisphere and 120,000 from the Western Hemisphere (no more than 20,000 per sending country). Immediate family members were not subject to these restrictions. But after 1970, following an initial influx from European countries, immigrants began to hail from places like Korea, China, India, Vietnam, the Philippines, Pakistan, and countries in Africa. Latin America, which was not included in the old quota system, became the source of more legal (family reunification) and undocumented immigration under the new system because the 20,000 per year limit applies to all sending countries equally, regardless of their population's size or history of migration to the U.S.
New civil rights and new immigration provided a potential window of opportunity for other languages to flourish alongside English. In 1974 the Supreme Court ruled in Lau v. Nichols that schools in which non-Englishspeaking students could not ''participate meaningfully'' were violating the Civil Rights Act. The following year, Congress modified the Voting Rights Act of 1965 to include a provision for multilingual ballots and voting guides. These liberal provisions notwithstanding, the fourth wave of immigration, especially since the 1980s, has sparked a new wave of backlash against it, including e¤orts to enshrine the status of English.
1.3.1. O‰cial English? O‰cial English means that no one has the right to demand government documents or services in non-English languages, but governments may provide them as they see fit. Congress first considered declaring English the nation's o‰cial language in 1981, when a constitutional English language amendment was introduced by Senator Samuel I. Hayakawa. O‰cial English legislation (often referred to as ''English only'') is the primary goal of the organization U.S. English, founded by Senator Hayakawa in 1983. U.S. English now boasts 1.8 million members and has established two separate organizational arms: a foundation that sponsors research and English learning opportunities for immigrants, and a lobbying group (U.S. .
Between 1981 (Virginia) and 2007 (Kansas), twenty-eight states passed O‰cial English laws (Pro-English 2008). 11 Scholarly studies of the O‰-cial English movement show that its supporters range from liberals who see English as an important common bond to nativists who view nonEnglish speakers as unwanted aliens (Citrin 1990; Citrin et al. 1990; Frendreis and Tatalovich 1997) . It seems, however, that the movement's success is largely due to its framing of O‰cial English in terms of patriotism, not intolerance. As summarized by political scientists John Frendreis and Raymond Tatalovich (1997: 365) , backing coalesced around ''the attitude that speaking English is related to being a good American.'' Majority support for O‰cial English laws was ''connected to attitudes that are clearly related to this broader issue of national identity, which does not neatly coincide with existing dimensions of political conflict'' (p. 366).
On the ground, state-level O‰cial English laws have had little impact on language usage in government or by individuals. States with O‰cial English laws continue to provide documents and services in non-English languages on a level comparable to those with no such laws. A recent phone survey 12 of 124 municipal governments within U.S. metro areas that are at least 5 percent Latino reveals that 40 percent of the cities o¤er premium pay to Spanish-English bilinguals. Like the provision of nonEnglish documents and services, these premiums correspond to needs that teachers, social service providers, police, and other municipal employees serve rather than the presence or absence of a state-level language policy. Cities in California and Florida, where O‰cial English laws are in place, are just as likely to o¤er bilingual premiums as cities in Arizona and Texas, where no such laws exist. In addition, O‰cial English laws do not seem to influence people's linguistic choices. Research about the contexts that shape U.S.-born Latino adults' maintenance of Spanish alongside English (Linton 2004a) shows no relationship between state O‰cial English legislation and bilingualism or English monolingualism, even with exclusive consideration of O‰cial English laws passed by referendum.
English plus?
At least partly in reaction to advocacy by U.S. English and similar groups, another set of activists have organized to promote a model of immigrant incorporation that involves learning by people with a long U.S. heritage as well as by newcomers. English Plus has responded to O‰cial English supporters by uniting civil rights and educational organizations to promote ''a strong belief that all U.S. residents should have the opportunity to become proficient in English plus one or more other languages'' (English Plus 2000) . For nonnative speakers, this means acquiring proficiency in English and maintaining proficiency in their native language(s). For native English speakers, it means a viable opportunity to become proficient in another language alongside English. Proponents of English Plus view linguistic diversity (and other aspects of cultural diversity) as a national strength that provides the United States with a ''unique reservoir of understanding and talent'' (EPIC 1992 (EPIC [1987 : 152). New Mexico, Oregon, Rhode Island, and Washington have passed such measures, which primarily aim to educate the public about language policy issues (Crawford 1997a Where does this leave the U.S. today, with the global economy and national security concerns providing new incentives for Americans to speak English and one or more other languages? During the fourth wave of immigration the U.S., social science theories of immigrant incorporation have become more nuanced, integrating forms of capital that immigrants possess, laws, institutions, and contexts of reception (see, e.g., Alba and Nee 2003; Rumbaut 1996, 2001; Portes and Zhou 1993) . Contemporary theories also problematize the myth of a monolithic ''mainstream American culture.'' Specifically in regard to language, political philosopher Will Kymlicka asserts:
The claim that all Americans share a common culture based on the English language is clearly false. Yet there is a kernel of truth in it. The United States has integrated an extraordinary number of people from very di¤erent backgrounds into a common culture. The vast majority of Americans do in fact participate in the same societal culture, based on the English language. At other times and in other places, di¤erences in ethnicity, race, region, class, gender, and religion were often assumed to preclude the possibility of a common culture. But in the United States and other modern societies, the common culture is capacious, integrating a rich array of groups. (Kymlicka 1995: 77) 2. Contemporary language policies in U.S. public schools Schools are a (if not the) primary vehicle for the transmission of culture and a sense of national identity. They also serve as the gateway to participation in the political and economic arena. As we have seen, school language policy is thus a very powerful and sometimes contentious mechanism for locating languages and their use within the social structure (Bloemraad 2006; Linton 2004b ).
''Bilingual'' education
The fourth wave of immigration to the U.S. has been accompanied by a long debate about ''bilingual education,'' curricula developed under the Bilingual Education Act (BEA), Title VII of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, and subsequent revisions. The majority of these ''bilingual'' school programs involve instruction in a child's native tongue, but their goal is English proficiency, not first-language development or literacy (Snow and Hakuta 1992) . The 1994 amendments to the BEA reflected a new valuation of fluent bilingualism. 13 These revisions were guided by a growing body of research about how children acquire languages and how they excel in other subjects. The 1994 BEA incorporated provisions for professional development, language maintenance, foreign-language instruction, and research and evaluation.
Language rights advocate James Crawford summarized the two guiding principles of the 1994 BEA as follows: -Given access to challenging curriculum, language minority and LEP (limited English proficient) students can achieve to the same high standards as other students. -Proficient bilingualism is a desirable goal, which can bring cognitive, academic, cultural, and economic benefits to individuals and to the nation (Crawford 1997b: 1) .
These goals and ideals laid the groundwork for major reforms in the education of language minority and language majority students. But shortly after Title VII was reauthorized, the purpose it embodied came under attack on Capitol Hill and in the press. Reflecting the strongly anti-bilingual political climate, Congress considered repealing the BEA, and reduced its funding by 38 percent. This severely undermined the new BEA by forcing deep cuts in grants for instructional programs; teacher training; and research, evaluation, and support services (Freeman 1998: 55) . Meanwhile, a move away from bilingual education was gaining momentum. The group ''English for the Children,'' founded and directed by physicist and Silicon Valley software magnate Ron Unz, initiated a national crusade to end transitional bilingual education. English for the Children was instrumental in introducing and passing anti-bilingual propositions in California, Massachusetts, and Arizona. These states have adopted policies that place LEP children in structured (sometimes called ''sheltered'') English immersion (SEI) settings for a limited time (in California, one year) and then transfer them to mainstream classrooms. In structured immersion, English learners are instructed in all subjects in simplified English. A modification of the structured immersion model practiced in some schools involves placing LEP children directly into mainstream classrooms and then supplementing their English learning via pull-out English as a second language (ESL) sessions.
English for the Children drew support from a diverse constituency. Some parents and educators were raising serious concerns about the length of time (in some cases, eight or more years) that children spent in bilingual programs before they were deemed ready to study alongside native English-speakers (Martinez 1999; Tobar 1999) . Others remarked that children struggle when they move from bilingual to all-English classes (Alvarado 2001) . Increased emphasis and reliance on the outcomes of standardized tests (in English) as measures of school and teacher quality also encouraged school districts to adopt language policies that promote a rapid transition to English, but do nothing to maintain or develop native-language proficiency.
The fact that many bilingual programs were at least as successful as SEI at teaching English went largely unnoticed amidst the sudden fervor for English immersion. Why? Proponents of bilingual education alleged that insistence on SEI masked a backlash against immigration. For example, linguists Catherine Snow and Kenji Hakuta (1992) asserted that the debate about bilingual pedagogy was really a debate about politics. Education professor Douglas E. Mitchell and colleagues (1999) reached the same conclusion, though their focus was on the politics of national identity, not immigration.
Dual-language education: a countertrend
Since the 1960s, a small but growing number of United States public schools have adopted two-way bilingual immersion programs (also called dual-language, dual-immersion, or two-way immersion). These programs are noteworthy because in them the enrollment of children whose native language is not English as an essential asset, not a liability or a complication. Language-minority (from a single language background -usually Spanish) and English-speaking pupils learn together, instructed by one or more teachers, from the time they begin school through at least the fifth grade. Program objectives include high academic achievement, bilingual proficiency, biliteracy, and multicultural understanding (Christian 1994) . Dual-language programs are never legally mandated and have remained largely o¤ the political radar screen, though they certainly embody the goals of the 1994 BEA and the English Plus movement. In Massachusetts dual-language programs are exempt from the state's antibilingual education statute.
Education researchers and practitioners are paying attention to twoway immersion for several practical reasons. First of all, it is an e¤ective way for English learners to become proficient in English while pursuing an enriched curriculum. Second, it holds great promise as a strategy for diminishing -if not closing -the achievement gap between low-and high-SES students in general, and Latino and white 14 students in particular. And it enhances cognitive, linguistic, and cross-cultural skills (Collier 1989; Freeman 1998; Gó mez et al. 2005; Lindholm-Leary 2001 Orihuela 2003; Thomas and Collier 1997 ; for more general findings about the cognitive benefits of bilingualism and biliteracy, see Bochner 1996; Glick and White 2003; Hakuta and Díaz 1985; Lutz 2002; Peal and Lambert 1962; Portes and Rumbaut 2001) .
A more theoretical focus motivates immigration scholars' interest in twoway immersion. These programs exemplify schools' institutionalization of the idea that newcomers to the United States are continually ''remaking the mainstream'' (Alba and Nee 2003; Bean and Stevens 2003; Hirschman 2005) and that immigrant acculturation is a two-way process Ló pez 1996; Yinger 1994) . Dual-language programs also provide institutional backing for selective acculturation Rumbaut 1996, 2001; Portes and Zhou 1993) : a process through which ethnic networks and strong communities support the children of immigrants as they learn to deal with life in the U.S., with an outcome of upward assimilation combined with bilingualism and biculturalism. Furthermore, by supporting Spanish maintenance two-way immersion could contribute to the replenishment of Latino identities within the U.S. -a phenomenon that is primarily driven by continuous immigration (Jiménez 2008) . It also appears that this form of schooling is nurturing or creating transnational and/or global identities that transcend language -among students, parents, and teachers (Castles 2000; Levitt 2001 ).
Dual-language education is still relatively rare, but the number of programs has been steadily rising since the early 1990s. The Center for Applied Linguistics (CAL) directory currently lists 335 programs (CAL 2008) . Since the directory relies on information submitted by individual school administrators, it understates the actual number of programs. For the 2007-2008 school year, the California Department of Education 15 recognized 201 dual-language programs, whereas CAL only listed 107. Proposition 227 was a temporary setback for some dual-language programs, but in the longer term the law has had little e¤ect on their continuance and growth (Linton and Franklin forthcoming) . In fact, schools that have initiated two-way immersion in recent years are advantaged in that they have much more research and curriculum development to draw on.
New developments in the immigration debate: does language matter?
Before adjourning for the summer of 2006, the 109th Congress considered several proposals for reform. None of these manifested much recognition of recommendations derived from social science research, particularly in terms of shifting enforcement from the border to the workplace (Cornelius 2001 (Cornelius , 2005 Massey 2002 ), incorporating pathways towards citizenship for all immigrants, recruiting immigrants that best serve the country's economic needs, or linking immigration policy with foreign policy (Rosenblum 2006) . The proposals' flaws aside, this Congressional debate mobilized tens of thousands of immigrants, their children, and supporters in favor of amnesty for undocumented immigrants -as well as a small number of extremely vociferous vigilantes (''Minutemen'') who have taken it upon themselves to patrol parts of the U.S.-Mexico border and harass would-be day laborers. Pushed into a political corner by members of his own party, vigilantes, and their sympathizers (notably CNN anchor Lou Dobbs), President Bush ordered the mobilization of alreadystretched National Guard forces to buttress the Department of Homeland Security's border patrol and authorizing the construction of a 700-mile fence along the U.S.-Mexico border.
Congress has yet to propose viable immigration policy reforms, but the issue in not likely to go away. Since 9/11 immigration policy is linked to homeland security, it is probable that anti-immigration activists will retain their focus regardless of economic up-or downswings. At the same time, those for whom this issue has been a catalytic event that activated them to exercise political voice are not apt to recede into the shadows. Many of the protestors who filled the streets of Los Angeles, New York, and other major cities on May 1, 2006, were the U.S.-born children of immigrants. If they are not already old enough to vote they will soon be, and on immigration matters their votes will likely reflect their parents' or grandparents' interests. 16 Timed to accompany the pro-immigration rallies, a group of Latino musicians released Nuestro Himno, a Spanish-language version of the U.S. National Anthem. 17 It was hardly a coincidence that two-anda-half weeks later the U.S. Senate voted in support of James Inhofe's (R-Oklahoma) proposal to amend a pending immigration bill to include a clause making English the ''national language'' of the United States. Though national language policies are mostly symbolic (e.g., the national language of Ireland is Gaeilge), an a‰rmative Senate vote could shore up support for H.R. 4408, and O‰cial English bill introduced on November 8, 2005, by Representative Steve King (R-Iowa). This bill stipulates that all business of the U.S. government, including publications, be conducted in English and that ''no person has the right, entitlement, or claim to have the Government of the United States or any of its o‰cials or representative act, communicate, perform or provide services, or provide materials in any language other than English.'' 18 Most strikingly, H.R. 4408 would repeal Section 203 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which established citizens' rights to ballots in non-English languages. On August 3, 2006 Senator Inhofe introduced an identical bill, S.3828. 19 Given many pressing domestic and global issues, why did members of the 109th Congress spend time on language politics? They could not credibly claim that the economic and social primacy of English is imperiled, or that Spanish is taking over the country. Today's children of Latino immigrants are retaining Spanish alongside English more than in the past Portes and Rumbaut 2001; Rumbaut 2002 ). Yet a recent study using data that allowed the researchers to examine linguistic trends across immigrant generations in Southern California, where the Mexican-origin population 20 exceeds five million, shows that Spanish retention among Mexicans is still quite low (Rumbaut et al. 2006) . Only 17 percent of third-generation Mexicans with three or four foreign-born grandparents report that they speak Spanish well. Among those with only one or two foreign-born grandparents, only 7 percent are proficient in Spanish (p. 454) . And the children and grandchildren of immigrants who do maintain Spanish are bilinguals, not Spanish monolinguals.
Despite the fact that English-only supporters' fears are not supported by data, it would be unwise to disregard proposals to make English the national or o‰cial language of the United States as fleeting notions put forward by extremists in Congress. The strength and longevity of the O‰cial English movement is evidence of this. To the extent that groups such as U.S. English (2004) employ data to garner voter support, they report statistics derived from poll data indicating that a majority of likely voters already believe that English should be the country's o‰cial language. Much more powerfully, U.S. English draws on basic notions embedded in American identity. For example, from the premise that ''English is the language of opportunity'' it is not far-fetched to assume a link between government services in non-English languages, immigrants' failing to learn English or learning it more slowly, and denial of economic opportunity to immigrants -even though no such link exists. On a more subliminal level, O‰cial English activism taps into perceived threats to an Anglo-Protestant dominated imagination of Americans' way of life. Referring to the emergence of the O‰cial English movement in the 1980s, linguist Thomas Ricento observed: [M]any Americans, especially in large cities, felt their way of life was under assault. The sounds of Spanish, Korean, Chinese, Arabic, and many other languages were heard with increasing frequency in American towns and cities; the American border in the southwest was too porous; projections of demographic patterns showed that older immigrant populations were not replacing themselves as quickly as were the newer non-European groups. (Ricento 1995: 1) Echoing the above, at a 2006 campaign appearance by California governor Arnold Schwarzenegger, the vice president of an Orange County Republican club said that although he supported Mr. Schwarzenegger, he wanted the governor to take a harder line on immigration because he could not bear hearing more and more Spanish being spoken in the county, and wondered about the legality of the newcomers because ''we are being overloaded with a potential hazard'' (Archibold 2006, italics added) .
These examples illustrate what for some is a clear connection between linguistic discomfort and immigration policy concerns. We do not know the full extent to which American voters make this connection, but it is not trivial. Language politics will undoubtedly influence the contemporary immigration debate in terms of who should be allowed to immigrate, what is expected of immigrants, and how the children of immigrants are educated. The potential implications of a federal O‰cial English policy are far greater than those of a declaration that English is the national language, but it is unlikely that voters will di¤erentiate between the two. And if state-level statutes are any indication, even an O‰cial English amendment would not change much in practice.
Concluding thoughts
There are at least two ways that language should matter in the immigration debate. First of all, the U.S. government should devote adequate resources to providing ESL courses and community-based resources for adult immigrants. In her exploration of why immigrants to Canada are much more likely to become citizens than their counterparts in the U.S., Irene Bloemraad identifies key institutional di¤erences between the two countries. Canadian policy provides ''symbolic support and instrumental aid [including funds for teaching English or French] to ethnic organizations and community leaders'' (Bloemraad 2006: 193) . In the United States, immigrant incorporation is the domain of state-level policy and civil society. 21 This results not only in lower rates of naturalization but also di¤erent motives for naturalization. The Portuguese immigrants and Vietnamese refugees Bloemraad interviewed in Boston stated no particular reasons for their choices to naturalize or not; it did not seem important to them. But among their counterparts in Toronto there was a clear narrative of naturalization as a gateway to participatory citizenship. This indicates not only that the Canadian government's approach to immigrant incorporation is more pragmatic but also that, in the U.S., explicit or implicit assimilationist policies that marginalize new immigrants on the basis of language, race, and class hinder rather than encourage the integration of immigrant.
My second suggestion derives from the less-addressed idea that immigration policy can be a foreign policy tool. Political scientist Mark Rosenblum argues that reforming U.S. immigration policy would have ''significant diplomatic bang for the buck'' in regard to relations with immigrant-sending countries (Rosenblum 2006: 22) . Immigration policy might also be an instrument of diplomacy when it favors immigrants who know strategically important languages and cultures. By far the most common foreign languages taught in U.S. primary and secondary schools are Spanish and French; very few schools o¤er Persian, Arabic, Chinese, Hindi and other languages that the U.S. government deems critical for national defense and economic security (Black 2006 
